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The  European  Commission  White  Paper  (1985)  on  "Completing  the  Internal 
Market"  underlines  the  role  played  by  cooperation  among  firms,  which  is 
viewed  as  an  important  means  of  improving  European  competitiveness, 
especially  in  high  technology.  In  the  first  part  of  our  paper,  section  1 
looks at  the main  factors  that facilitate or hinder cooperation in general, 
and  that  constitute  the  basic  ingredients  of  a  private  firm's  cost-benefit 
analysis.  It is suggested  that  on  the  whole,  the  probability of  collusion, 
tacit  or  explicit,  is  greater  than  what  is  suggested  by  conventional 
wisdom.  Section 2  discusses  the  public  view of  cooperation  in light  of  the 
goals  and  tools  of  European  conpetition policy,  and  stresses  the  pragmatic 
application  of  Article  85  of  the  Treaty  of  Rome.  The  second  part  of  the 
paper  illustrates  how  these  issues  are  involved  in  cooperative  agreements 
in  R  &  D.  Our  analysis  first  shows  that  from  a  private  point  of  view 
benefits  from  such  a  cooperation,  although  real,  are  more  difficult  to 
identify  and  to  capture.  The  following  section  explores  the  arguments  in 
favour  of  socially  beneficial  effects  of  cooperative  research  and  shows 
that  cooperation  can  improve  the  incentive  problem  as  well  as  provide  a 
more  efficient  sharing  of  information  than  non  cooperative  behaviour.  This 
gives  some  support  to  the  permissive  European  regulation  allowing 
cooperative  research  whereby  member  firms  share  the  costs  and  the  results 
of  a  research  project.  A general  conclusion  is  that  too  much  collusion  is 
expected  to  occur in domains  where  non-cooperative,  non-collusive behaviour 
would  be  more  efficient;  and  too  little collusion  can  occur  in activities 
where  socially desirable  outcomes  might arise from  cooperation,  R & D being 
a  case  in point. Contents 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over  the  past  few  years,  the  traditional  view  that  market  structure 
largely  determines  the  conduct  (or  behaviour)  of  firms  in  a  market,  and 
industry  structure  determines  industry  performance,  has  lost  ground.  The 
"New  Industrial  Organization"  literature  insists  on  the  central  role  of 
market  ~nduct,  the  necessity  of  detailed  analysis  of  business  behaviour 
and  the  usefulness  of  well-defined  microeconomic  models  to  understand  the 
complex  relationships  characterizing  the  structure-conduct-performance 
paradigml).  Given  the  dynamic  nature  of  strategic  competition,  each  firm 
knows  that over  time  its behaviour  can  have  an  effect  upon  the  other  firms 
and  that  its  best  plan  of  action  depends  upon  the  plans  chosen  by  its 
rivals.  Firms  must  then  be  conceived  as  actors  able  to  modify  to  some 
extent  their  environment  instead  of  being  subject  to  it.  In  this 
perspective  the  configuration  of  industrial  structures  and  organizational 
forms  is  as  much  the  outcome  of  deliberate  strategies  as  of  initial 
conditions  and  predetermined  rules  of  the  game2). 
One  crucial  strategic  choice  for  a  firm  is  between  collusive  and 
non-collusive  behaviour.  While  collusion  is  generally  expected  to  raise  a 
firm's  profits,  it  is  also  in  the  interest  of  each  firm  to  let  its 
competitors  pay  the  cost of  cooperation and  to gain a  "free-ride" by acting 
as  an  independent  outsider.  From  the  point  of  view  of  public interest,  the 
question  is  also  complex,  and  there  have  been  many  changes  in  academic 
1)  An  overview of  this literature is given in J. Stiglitz and  F.  Matthewson 
(ed.)  1986 
2)  For  an  extensive analysis,  see A.  Jacquemin  (1987). -2-
thinking  and  antitrust  policy.  At  times  it  has  been  fashionable  to 
emphasize  the  negative  effects  of  collusion,  such  as  deviations  from 
marginal-cost  pricing,  which  reduce  welfare.  At  other  times,  emphasis  has 
been  put  on  the  dynamic  effects  such  as  the  provision  of  new  technologies 
and  new  products  which  could  be  fostered  by  cooperative  behaviour.  For 
example,  Article 85  of  the Treaty of  Rome  condemns  agreements  between  firms 
and  concerted  practices  which  may  affect  trade  between  Member  States.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  White  Paper  on  Completing  the  Internal  Market  (1985, 
p.  34)  states  that:  "The  removal  of  internal  boundaries  and  the 
establishment  of  free  movement  of  goods  and  capital  and  the  freedom  to 
provide  services  are  clearly  fundamental  to  the  creation  of  the  internal 
market.  Nevertheless,  Community  action  must  go  further  and  create  an 
environment  or  conditions  likely  to  favour  the  development  of  cooperation 
between  undertakings.  Such  cooperation will  strengthen  the  industrial  and 
commercial  fabric  of  the  internal  market •••••  The  Commission  will  seek  to 
ensure  that  Commuity  budgetary  and  financial  facilities  make  their  full 
contribution  to  the  development  of  greater  cooperation  between  firms  in 
different Member  States". 
The  purpose  of  this  policy  paper  is  to  suggest  that  too  much 
collusion,  tacit  and  explicit,  can  be  expected  in  many  domains  where 
non-cooperative,  non-collusive  behaviour  would  be  socially more  efficient, 
and  that  too  little  collusion  can  occur  in  activities  where  socially 
desirable  outcomes  might  arise  from  cooperation,  R  &  D  being  a  case  in 
point.  In  the first part,  we  deal with  the general  problem of  collusion.  We 
first  identify,  on  the  basis  of  recent  models,  various  situations 
facilitating  the  adoption  and  stabilization  of  collusive  behaviour 
(sectio  1).  We  then  discuss  the  public  view  of  collusion  in  light  of 
European competition policy which,  contrary to the  US  approach,  provides  an 
"efficiency defence"  for  some  collusive actions  (section 2).  In  the  second 
part  of  the  paper,  we  consider  cooperative  agreements  in  R  &  D.  A 
discussion  of  the  private  costs  and  benefits  of  joint  R  &  D  (section  1) 
leads  to  the  conclusion  that  specific characteristics  of  R  & D,  mainly  the 
difficulty  of  appropriating  the  results  of  the  joint  efforts,  tend  to 
impede  and  destabilize many  agreements  in this  domain.  A brief  public  cost -3-
benefit  analysis  (section  2)  suggests  in  other  respects  that  cooperative 
R & D can  sometimes  improve  efficiency.  This  provides  support  for  the  1985 
permissive  European  regulation  allowing  cooperative  research  whereby 
members  firms  agree  to  share  the  costs  and  the  fruits  of  a  research 
project. 
PART  I:  COLLUSIVE  BEHAVIOUR.  AND  EUR.OPEAN  ANTITRUST  POLICY 
The  conventional  wisdom  underlines  various  intrinsic  difficulties  at 
each  state  of  the  collusive  process:  reaching  an  agreement,  detecting 
cheating,  punishing credibly the defector.  This  could  lead  to  the view that 
the  probability of  collusion tacit  or  explicit  is  very  small.  But  in  fact 
collusive arrangements  are  common  practice and  every year  a  great number  of 
cases  are  brought  to  the  European  Commission  and  the  European  Court  of 
Justice  (see  the  Annual  Reports  on  Competition  Policy  published  by  the 
European  Conununities).  Recent  models  have  suggested  some  explanations  of 
this  paradox. 
Section 1:  Factors  that facilitate collusion 
Various  factors  tend  to  make  collusion  successful.  Let  us  consider 
infinitely  repeated  oligopoly  games  and  suppose  that  each  player  chooses 
its quantity  of  production3)  in order  to  maximize  its discounted  stream of 
profits.  Then 
00  't,.... 
£L = r.  w  II  ~t 
i=O 
where  'iii.  t  is  the  ith firm's  profit  in  period  t  and  w  =  1/  (1+r)  is  the 
discount  factor  (r  being  the  discount  rate).  Denoting  by 'ifL *  the  firm's 
profit  under  a  tacitly  collusive  equilibrium,  firm  i  earns 11'(.
11 I  (1-w)  by 
cooperating permanently. 
3)  For  a  discussion  of  price-setting  supergames  (repeated  Bertrand  games), 
see  Brock and  Scheinkman  (1985). -4-
Let  us  assume  that  that  on  the  contrary if one  of  the  players defects, 
it will  induce  non-cooperative  behaviour  in  all  the  subsequent  periods. 
Calling7~~the defector's profit during  the  one  period in which is deviates 
from  the collusive scheme  and~lc the non-cooperative profits following its 
deviation,  the  defector's  overall  payoff  in  the  game  is  given  by 
II~  cl  +  w/ ( 1-w) li'  l, c  •  Tacit  collusion  will  be  the  outcome  so  long  as  the 
profit  obtained  by  colluding  is  no  less  than  the  profit  obtained  by 
defecting.  The  corresponding well-kown condition is: 
d.  Jr. 
'it'~  -'lr~ 
w?..  ~=1  .... n. 
11' i.d  _II' Lc 
This  equation allows  us  to  identify several conditions  for  tacit collusion: 
(i)  If  w  is  close  enough  to  unity,  i.e.  if firms  give  enough  weight  to 
the  future,  non-cooperative  collusion  can  be  sustained.  As  a  high  w 
means  that  successive  periods  payoffs  are  highly  valued,  this 
condition  also  implies  that  the  scope  for  tacit  collusion  is  great 
when  detection  lags  are  short.  This  suggests  that  "policies  designed 
to  make  secret  price cuts  possible  are  valuable  in  undermining  tacit 
collusion  or  conscious  parallelism.  And  industry  practices  that 
inhibit  secret  price  setting  should  be  subject  to  close  antitrust 
scrutiny  (Shapiro,  1986). 
(ii)  Profits  from  defection  must  be  bound  (  iT'~d t.  t?o  for  all  i)  and  the 
smaller  these  profits,  the  higher  the  supportable  level  of  collusive 
profit 7r' L  i' • 
(.  ·- (iii)  Only  mild  punishments  ( 'ii  l.  <  7l'  l.  )  are  needed.  And  moreover  the  more 
severe 
of li\  * 
the  punishment  is  (the  lower "L  c  is),  the  higher  the  level 
that can  be  supported as  an equilibrium4). 
Note  that  there  are  various  ways  to  sustain  the  collusive  outcome 
non-cooperatively.  In  the  previous  model,  firm  j  cooperates  with  i  unless 
4)  Shapiro  (1986)  remarks  that  this  leads  to  the  following  paradox:  any 
underlying  market  condition  that  makes  very  competitive  behaviour 
possible and  credible can,  by loweringtrtc'  actually promote  collusion! (2) 
-5-
and  until  i  defects,  in  which  case  j  is  triggered  into  perpetual 
non-cooperation.  An  alternative  and  less  severe  strategy  is  "tit-for-tat" 
(Axelrod,  1984),  according  to  which  each  firm  starts  by  playing  friendly 
and  then  chooses  in the  current  period  what  the  other  player  chose  in  the 
previous  periodS).  More  generally,  Abreu  (1984)  has  been  able  to 
characterize  what  he  calls  "optimal  penal  codes",  i.e.  the  most  effective 
credible  strategies  for  punishing  deviations  from  collusive  behaviour. 
Within  the  class  of  symmetric  punishments  (punishments  which  assume  that 
all  firms  act  identically),  he  shows  that  the  optimal  punishment  has  a 
two-phase  structure:  if  a  firm  deviates  from  collusive  behaviour,  there 
would  immediately  be  one  period  of  punishment,  followed  by  a  return to  the 
most  sustainable collusive configuration. 
Collusion  might  also  occur  non-cooperatively  in  the  finitely repeated 
game,  once  we  relax  the  artificial  assumption  of  complete  information  and 
suppose  instead  that  a  firm  has  a  small  degree  of  doubt  about  the 
motivation of  one  of  its rivals.  Then  "reputation"  can  operate  to maintain 
effective  collusion.  Similarly,  if  there  is  uncertainty  about  the  end  of 
the  game,  the  factor  w may  be  interpreted  as  the  probability  that  the  game 
will  continue  into  the  next  period.  When  this  probability  is  sufficiently 
high,  any  individually rational outcome  can be  sustained as  a  credible Nash 
collusive equilibrium of  the  repeated  game6). 
The  rapidly  growing  literature  suggests  that  the  number  of  possible 
tacitly collusive  strategies  and  outcomes  is  indeed  very  large  and  that it 
is  not  very  easy  to  make  the  solution  determinate.  If  the  equil~brium is 
not  unique,  then  "at  least  verbal  assent  will  be  required  on  which 
equilibrium  among  those  possible  will  be  chosen.  Such  discussion  might  be 
considered  tantamount  to  collusion  even  if  no  explicit  coordination  is 
needed after that  preliminary decision"  (Waterson,  1984,  p.  46). 
5)  Aumann  and  Sorin  (1986)  have  recently  provided  a  theoretical  basis  for 
the  situation  in  which  players  start  by  playing  friendly  and  continue 
with  tit for  tat  thereafter.  Their  model  shows  that  utility-maximizing 
behaviour  on  the  part  of  each  separate  individual  necessarily  leads  to 
cooperation. 
6)  An  individual  rational  outcome  is  what  a  firm  can  obtain  by  minimizing 
over  the  strategies  of  its  opponents  the  maximum  payoff  it can  achieve 
against  them,  i.e. its minmax  value. -6-
This  leads  us  to  the  case  of  explicit  collusion  or  cooperative 
behaviour.  Again  many  difficulties  have  been  mentioned  in  the  literature 
about  cartels  (Osborn,  1976,  Jacquemin  and  Slade,  1986):  locating  the 
contract  surface,  i.e.  the  points  or  set  of  points  providing  maximum 
profits  to  the  cartel,  sharing  activities  and  results  between  members; 
maintaining members  in the cartel and  controlling non-members  (either firms 
already  in  the  industry  or  entrants  attracted  by  the  high  profits);  and 
detecting  breaches  of  the  agreement  and  deterring  effective  breaches 
through various  types of penalties. 
Various  answers  can  be  given  to  these  problems7).  We  should  like  to 
focus  on  one  important aspect. 
Once  the explicit formation  of  a  cartel has  been decided,  stability of 
this  cartel  does  not  necessarily  require  coercitive  mechanism  or  side 
payments.  Thus  d'Aspremont,  Jacquemin,  Gabszewicz  and  Weymark  {1983)  have 
shown  that  there  is always  stability for  a  cartel establishing  the  leading 
price if the set of  firms  is finite.  To  illustrate the  argument,  let  there 
be  a  set  of  n  identical  firms,  k  of  which  form  a  cartel  that  fixed  the 
price in such a  way  that profits are maximized  for  each firm in the cartel, 
given  that  production  of  competitive  firms  is  determined  by  the  equality 
between  the  fixed  price and  their marginal  cost.  Because all firms  sell at 
the  same  price  and  because  the  firms  in  the  fringe  choose  without  any 
constraints the output  that maximizes  their profit at this price,  we  have 
~.f(n 1 k) ~'lr..f(n,k) 
where 'II f(k)  and 7r'.f(k)  denote  the  profits  of  firms  in  the  fringe  and  the 
cartel respectively. 
Two  types  of stability are  then defined.  A cartel made  up  of  k  members 
has  internal stability if k.2..1  and  if 'il f(n,k-1) ~  1r ..f.(n,k);  it has  external 
stability if k~ n-1  and if '7t .l(n,k+1) '7tf(n,k).  The  cartel is called stable 
l) For  example  MacLeod,  Norman  and  Thisse  (1986),  using  a  solution  concept 
based  on  models  of  spatial competition,  have  shown,  in a  two  stage game, 
that  once  market  areas  have  been  determined  by  the  Bertrand-Nash 
competitive  process,  collusion in price  becomes  feasible  and  profitable 
even  given  free  entry.  Indeed  a  switch  to  the  appropriate  Bertrand-Nash 
pricing is a  credible threat. -7-
if there is internal and  external stability at the  same  time  d'Aspremont  et 
al.  then  wrote  a  simple  algorithm  showing  that  there  is  always  a  stable 
cartel.  Having  established  that  the  profits  of  each  firm  in  the  cartel 
increase with  the size of  the cartel,  they assumed  that the cartel with k=1 
has  internal stability. If the  case k=1  also has  external stability,  then a 
stable cartel has  been  found.  Otherwise,  the  case  k=2  is  considered:  this 
has  internal  stability,  or  else  the  process  would  have  stopped at  k=1.  If 
k=2  has  external  stability,  the  search  for  a  stable  cartel  has  ended. 
According  to  the  algorithm,  either  a  stable  cartel  is  found  with  k  n,  or 
the  algorithm  reaches  k=n.  In  this  case,  k=n  has  internal  stability,  and 
because all the  firms  are included,  the monopoly  cartel is stable. Building 
on  DJGW,  Donsimoni  ( 1985)  examines  the  impact  of  variations  in  cost  and 
demand  conditions  on  the  structure  of  the  stable  cartel.  In  her  model, 
demand  and  cost  functions  are  linear  and  costs  vary  across  firms.  As 
before,  with  a  finite  number  of  firms  there  always  exists  a  stable cartel. 
In  addition,  the  members  of  the  stable  cartel  are  the  efficient  firms 
(those  with  low  costs).  Finally  the  size  of  the  cartel  is  a  decreasing 
function of  the  industry  ela~ticity of  demands). 
From  this  section,  it  appears  that  a  private  firm's  cost  benefit 
analysis  of  collusive  behaviour  is  a  complex  matter.  But  several  factors 
can  in general  promote  cooperati'on:  making  the  future  more  important  than 
the  present,  making  the  interactions  between  firms  more  durable  and  more 
frequent,  improving  the  firm's  ability  to  recognize  defection  when  it 
occurs,  changing  the  payoff  structure  so  that  the  punishment  for  defection 
is  greater  and  the  gains  from  mutual  cooperation  higher  and  more  easily 
apppropriable,  recognizing  the  effects  of  its  own  action  on  the  structure 
of  the market. 
At  the  light  of  the  European  Competition  Policy,  we  shall  see  in  the 
next  section if the existence of  the often observed collusive behaviour has 
positive or negative  connotations  from  the point of view of  social welfare. 
8)  For  further  results,  see Rothschild  (1984),  Donsimoni  et alii (1986). -8-
Section 2:  Collusion and  European Coapetition Policy 
Article  85  of  the  Treaty  of  Rome  contains  a  broad  prohibition  of 
explicit  and  tacit  collusion  where  it  is  likely  to  affect  trade  between 
Member  States and  has  as its purpose  or  result  the  prevention,  restriction, 
or  distortion  of  competition  within  the  Common  Market.  Such  collusive 
agreements  are  void  unless  EC  Commission  is notified of  them  and  grants  an 
exemption. 
A  priori,  such  a  broad  prohibition  could  be  based  on  one  or  several 
goals  which  are  traditionally  at  the  core  of  competition  policy.  One 
eventual goal is the diffusion of private economic  power,  the protection of 
individual  freedom  and  individual  rights.  The  use  of  cartels  can  then  be 
seen  as  a  radical  departure  from  such  an  individualism9).  This  aspect, 
which  was  originally  basic  to  antitrust  legislation,  still  occupies  an 
important  place,  although  perhaps  more  at  the  level  of  public  opinion  than 
at policy level. 
A  second  eventual  goal  of  competition  policy  may  be  to  protect  the 
economic  freedom  of market  competitors.  Here  the  protection of  competitors 
takes  precedence  over  the  defence  of  the  competitive  process  as  such. 
9)  It is in the light of  these  "non-economic  values"  that Mestmacker  (1980) 
has  characterized  the  attitude  adopted  by  German  authorities  with 
respect  to  cartels  before  World  War  II.  "The  Nazis",  he  wrote,  "had 
shown  how  to  transform highly concentrated and  cartelized economy  into a 
central  planning  system  •••  Boycotts  and  collective  discriminations  were 
applied  against  outsiders  in  order  to  discipline  them  in  the  public 
interest.  If  the  more  traditional  measures  of  economic  coercion  proved 
insufficient  for  the  purpose,  even  the  formal  transformation  of  private 
cartels  into  compulsory  cartels  was  provided  for  after  1933"  (p.  388). 
Mestmacker  adds  that  acceptance  of  cartels  was  not  limited  to 
conservatives  who  cherished  them  as  safeguards  against  the  anarchy  of 
free  competition.  Marxists  also  looked  upon  cartels  (and  concentration) 
as  forerunners  of  rational socialist planning.  He  quotes  Hilferding,  who 
interpreted  this  development  as  tending  towards  "a  uni  versa!  cartel, 
that  is  a  rationally  regulated  society"!  According  to  Fox  ( 1986),  the 
u.s.  Clayton act's  sponsors  were  motivated  by  ··a  belief  that Hitler had 
attained  power  through  the  support  of  the  German  cartels.  They  feared 
that  high  industrial  concentration  would  tip  the  country  either  into 
socialism  or  communism,  on  the  one  hand,  or  fascism  on  the  other•• 
(p.  565,  note  60). -9-
Attention  will  be  directed  towards  abusive  practices  such  as  coercion, 
discrimination,  refusal  to  sell,  boycotts,  and  cartels  through  which 
powerful  firms  might  endanger  the  existence  of  weaker  competitors.  This 
type  of  approach  is  particularly  in  evidence  in  European  countries  in  the 
national  laws  of  "unfair competition"10). 
A  distinction  is  then  usually  made  between  competition  policy 
concerning  efficiency  and  market  injury,  and  competition  law  concerning 
unfair  conduct  and  private injury to  one  or  a  few  firms.  In most  instances, 
like  the  law  on  boycott,  fairness  and  efficiency  require  the  same  outcome, 
but  there  are  situations  where  a  conflict  could  arise.  An  especially 
important  one  in  the  domain  of  cartels  concerns  exclusive  dealing 
agreements.  The  basic  principle  expressed  in  the  Beguelin/G.L.  Import 
Export  case  (Judgment  of  the  Court,  25/II/71,  in  the  Court  of  Justice  of 
the European  Communities,  Reports  of  Cases  Before  the Court,  1971,  Part II, 
pp.  949-972)  is  that  an  exclusive  dealing  agreement  is  liable  to  affect 
trade  between  Member  States,  and  may  have  the  effect  of  impeding 
competition  if,  owing  to  the  combined  effects  of  the  agreement  and  of  the 
national  legislation  on  unfair  competition,  the  dealer  is  able  to  prevent 
parallel  imports  from  other  Member  States  from  entering  the  territory 
covered  by  the  agreement.  On  this  occasion  the  Court  of  Justice  clearly 
confirmed  that  the  European  rules  of  competition  were  not  formulated  to 
give protection to individual  competitors  on  the  basis of fair practices. 
10)  According  to  the  Paris  Convention  of  1883,  unfair  competition  is  "any 
act  of  competition  contrary  to  honest  practices  in  industrial  or 
commercial matters".  The  corresponding  laws  are  intended  to  ensure that 
the  competitors  fight  in  a  fair  way,  and  carry  out  their  social 
functions  according  to  an  ethical  code  of  conduct.  The  standard  of 
business  ethics  plays  an  important  role  in  developing  such  a  code  of 
honest  trade  practices,  but  it  is  ultimately  ascertained  through  the 
common  sense of  the courts. -10-
If there is a  conflict  between a  national  law on  unfair competition and  the 
European competition rules,  the latter predominates11). 
The  third  type of goal of competition policy is dear  to  the hearts of 
economists.  Competition  policy  is  one  of  the  main  instruments  to  assure 
consumer  welfare  through  both  allocati  ve  and  product!  ve  efficiency.  The 
neatest affirmation of  a  purely  efficiency-directed  competition  policy  has 
been  made  by  Bork  (1967).  According  to  his  view,  antitrust  law  must 
challenge  inefficient  conducts.  A necessary  {but  not  sufficient)  attribute 
of  inefficiency  is  a  restriction  of  output  beyond  levels  which  would 
prevail  under  competitive  conditions.  Conduct  not  so  identified  must  be 
presumed  to  enhance  efficiency,  and  should  not  be  the  subject  of  legal 
sanction12).  On  the  contrary  price-quantity  cartels  create  inefficiency 
which  can  be  measured  by  the well-known  formula  for  deadweight  loss D 
.  .  .. 
·t  t.  t 
D = 1/2 ~ £  h 'I .6p 
1. 
where  pi,  qi  and  e,  i  are  price,  quantities  and  the  price  elasticity  of 
demand  in  the  ith  sector,  the  symbol  A  representing  a  change  due  to 
monopoly  pricing13). 
However,  in recent  years  new  research  in industrial organization  has 
shown  that  simple  formulas  for  efficiency  appear  to  be  deceptive  and 
misleading. 
11)  According  to  the  Advocate-General,  "the  rule  of  national  law  on  the 
subject of unfair competition should  not  be  •••  used  for  purposes which 
conflict  with  the  general  objectives  of  the  common  market,  and  this 
places  a  corresponding  limit  or  restriction  on  the  exercise  of  the 
rights  to  which  in  this  field,  national  rules  give  rise" 
{op.cit.  p.970).  The  distinction  between  antitrust  law  and  laws 
governing  unfair  competition  has  been  strongly attacked,  especially  in 
the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany.  There  is  an  increasing  tendency  today 
to  consider  that  the  "unfairness"  of  the  individual  competitor  in his 
struggle  with  the  other  competitor(' s)  is  mainly  determined  by  his 
impact  on  the  functioning  of  the market.  Such  a  view has  been  defended 
in Germany  by  various members  of  the Max  Planck Institute. For  a  recent 
analysis,  see  Kaufman  (1986). 
12)  This  has  been  the  typical position of  the  so-called  "Chicago  School" 
13)  For a  general criticism of  this measure,  see  Jacquemin and  Slade  (1986) -11-
An  important  example  in  the  domain  of  collusive  behaviour  is  the 
sharing  of  information  by  oligopolists.  It  has  been  shown  that  the 
incentives  for  information-sharing  and  its  welfare  consequences  depend 
crucially  on  the  type  of  competition,  the  nature  of  the  goods,  and  the 
degree  of  product  differenciation.  Clarke  (1983)  demonstrates  that  with 
Cournot  competition  and  homogeneous  products,  there  is  never  a  mutual 
incentives  for  firms  in  the  industry  to  share  information unless  they  plan 
to  collude.  But  Vives  (1984)  finds- that  in  Bertrand  competition  or if  the 
goods  are  not  close  substitutes  the  results  are  reversed14).  More 
generally,  "free  competition"  can  lead  to  too  much  or  to  too  little 
information,  product  variety,  R  &  D,  entry,  etc  .15),  according  to  the 
characteristics of  the game. 
The  main  implication  is  that  once  the  neoclassical  paradigm  is 
abandoned,  there is no  longer  the  kind  of  general  theorem  about  the  Pareto 
optimality of  the methods  of strategic competition that we  have  for perfect 
competition.  The  results  are  at  best  ambiguous.  Furthermore,  with  the 
various  types  of  non-price  competition,  consumer  welfare  becomes  more 
multi-dimensional  and  includes  aspects  such  as  the  quality of  the  product, 
the  speed  and  security  of  the  supply  and  so  on.  Most  of  these  aspects  are 
14)  A  relatively  general  result  in  oligopoly  models  is  that  opposite 
results  are  obtained  as  firms  achieve  equilibrium  in  output  (Cournot) 
or  in  price  (Bertrand)  levels.  The  basic  explanation  is  that  a  firm 
faces  a  very  different  firm-specific  demand  in  the  two  cases:  when  the 
price  of  the  rival  is  taken  as  given,  the  firm's  perceived elasticity 
of  demand  is  larger  than  when  the  quantity  of  the  rival  is  taken  as 
given.  Thus  in Bertrand  equilibrium,  firms  quote  lower  prices  than  in 
Cournot  equilibrium.  The  case  of  information  pooling is an  application 
of  this  general  idea.  When  the  goods  are  substitutes,  in  Cournot 
competition,  pooling  of  information  has  two  effects.  First, it reduces 
the  variance  of  the  errors  about  the  random  intercept  of  the  (linear) 
demand  function  and  increases  expected  profits.  Second,  it  correlates 
the  strategies  that  the  firms  choose.  This  decreases  the  firm's 
expected  profits,  given  that  in  the  case  of  substitutable  goods  the 
optimal  choice  to  do  for  one  firm is  to  produce  a  high output when  the 
other  firm  is  expected  to  produce  a  low  one.  The  second  effect 
dominates.  On  the  contrary,  in  Bertrand  competition with  substitutes, 
correlation of strategies increases expected profits. 
15)  See  for  example,  Von  Weizsacker  (1980),  Dasgupta  and  Stiglitz  (1980), 
Perry  (1984). - 12-
not  measurable.  Value  judgements  are  necessary  to  determine,  for  example, 
whether allocating a  greater amount  of  resources  to activities which  result 
in  technological  change  or  product  variation  than  would  be  allocated  under 
a  more  "classical"  form  of  competition  contributes  enough  to  consumer 
welfare  to  outweigh  the  possible  losses  resulting  from  static 
inefficiencies.  On  the  whole,  a  precise  definition  of  the  "efficiency" 
criterion  is  more  apparent  than  real  and  most  of  the  time  requires  a 
delicate appreciation of  complex  trade-offs. 
In  contrast  to  the  u.s.  tradition16),  such  trade-offs  are  explicitly 
accepted  by  the  Treaty  of  Rome  in Article  85  para.  3,  according  to  which 
some  collusive  behaviour  restricting  competition  in  a  non  minor  way  may  be 
exempted  because  of  sufficient  beneficial  effects.  Four  conditions  are 
required: 
(i)  the agreement  must  contribute  to  the  improvement  of  the  production or 
distribution of  goods  or promote  technical or  economic  progress; 
(ii)  it must  allow ultimate  buyers  a  fair share of  the  resulting benefits; 
(iii)  the  restriction  must  be  necessary  for  the  attainment  of  the 
objective; 
(iv)  the  firms  concerned  must  be  unable  to  eliminate  competition  in 
respect  to a  substantial part of  the  product  in question. 
What  Williamson  {1968)  calls a  "naive  trade-off model"  for mergers  is 
a  good  way  of  illustrating these  conditions.  This  model  tells that in order 
16)  According  to  the  Report  of  the Attorney General's National  Committee  to 
Study  the  Antitrust  Law  (1955),  the  standard  adopted  in  the  Standard 
Oil of  New  Jersey case  (1911)  "makes  obsolete  once  prevalent  arguments, 
such  as,  whether  monopoly  arrangements  would  be  socially preferable  to 
competition in a  particular industry,  because  for  example  of  high fixed 
costs,  or  the  risk  of  cutthroat  competition  or  other  similar  unusual 
conditions".  See  also Procter & Gamble  (1967).  In the  1984  revisions of 
its merger  guidelines however,  the Justice Department  chose  to enact  as 
administrative policy what  the  US  Congress  has  refused  to  enact  as  law: 
mergers  that  are  illegal  under  section  7  of  the  Clayton  Act  would  be 
found  legal if they bring about  a  sufficient increase in efficiency. (3) 
- 13-
to appreciate whether  the cartel can benefit  from  the  "efficiency defence", 
it is  sufficient  to  compare  the  surface  corresponding  to  the  "deadweight 
loss",  i.e.  the  loss  of  consumer  welfare  which  is  not  otherwise 
compensated,  and  the  surface  corresponding  to  the  savings  in  resources 
which  become  available for alternative use. 
This  "naive"  static partial equilibrium model,  with  its cost-benefit 
analysis  limited  to  two-dimensional  terms  requires  a  number  of 
qualifications 
qualifications 
which 
include 
strongly 
matters 
reduce  its 
of  timing, 
operationality.  These 
non-price  competition, 
X-inefficiency,  income  distribution effects,  second-best considerations,  as 
well  as  the  inference  and  enforcement  expenses  needed  to  prove  the 
existence of  economies17).  What  is in fact  suggested by  such a  model  is the 
difficulty  of  identifying  precisely  the  efficiency  consequences  of  a 
business  conduct  and  of  advocating  fine-tuned  optimal antitrust rules.  The 
conditions  of  Article  85  para.  3  cannot  rely  on  a  strict welfare  analysis 
and  will  often  require  political  compromises  between  conflicting  and 
incommensurable values. 
These  dangers  can  be  reduced  in  two  ways.  The  first  one  would  be  to 
rely  more  on  the  use  of  a  reasonable  test  in  applying  Article  85 
para.118).  On  the basis of  the general  presumption that an antitrust policy 
augmenting  competitive  forces  is needed  to  enhance  efficiency,  a  pragmatic 
interpretation  of  Article  85  para.  1  could  broaden  the  number  of  cases 
where  economic  behaviour  can  be  said  to  comply  with  Article  85  without 
having  to resort  to  the criteria and  procedures  of  paragraph  3.  For  example 
this  interpretation  might  allow  some  type  of  vertical  agreements  which 
could  appear  to  represent  a  restriction of  competition,  but  which  actually 
do  not  impose  an  unreasonable  restraint  on  competition  or  even  increase it 
in  the  relevant  dynamic  and  uncertain  framework.  Given  the  previously 
17)  Williamson  (1977)  provides  himself  a  stimulating discussion  of  several 
qualifications of his model. 
18)  This  was  already  proposed  in  the  1970's  (Jacquemin,  1970).  Recently, 
Forrester  and  Norall  (1984)  have  defended  the  same  position  arguing 
that  in  determining  whether  there  was  a  restriction  of  competition 
within  the  meaning  of  Article  85  para.  1,  the  economic  nature  and 
consequences  of  the  conduct  involved have  to be  examined. - 14-
mentioned  theoretical  works  of  the  "new  industrial  organization",  it  is 
evident  that  this  approach  will  not  eliminate  the  ambiguities  nor  offer 
strong  legal  security  to  businessmen.  Nevertheless,  this  interpretation is 
less  demanding  than  the  trade-off  system  of  Article  85  para.  3,  which 
requires notifying and  disclosing all doubtful matters  to  the  Commission  in 
order  to  obtain  an  exemption19).  A  pragmatic  application  of  Article  85 
para.  1  could  reduce  information  and  transaction  costs20)  and  allow  the 
Commission  to  use  its  limited  resources  to  formulate  general  policies  and 
prosecute  important  cases. 
The  second  way  which  has  effectively  been  used  to  reduce  the  burden 
of  the  trade-off  is  to  implement  Article  85  para.  3,  not  so much  on  a  case 
by  case  basis,  but  by  granting  group  (or  block)  exemptions  dealing  with 
important  types  of  agreements  for  which  there  exists  a  presumption  that  a 
situation  of  market  failure  can  occur.  This  system  of  exempting  certain 
classes  of  agreements  from  the  notification  requirement  avoids  the 
necessity  of  a  detailed  analysis  of  each  conduct.  It  creates  codes  of 
conduct  that  can  increase  the  credibility  of  the  policy  and  limit  the 
discretionary power  involved in the Article.  At  the  same  time,  it preserves 
the  Article's  valuable  message  that  antitrust  policy  must  be  sensitive  to 
economies  and  that in some  circumstances  cooperative behaviour  can restrict 
competition  in  a  non-negligible  way  and  still  produce  socially  desirable 
results21). 
19)  There is no  duty  to notify,  but  the possibility of exemption can  be  one 
important  incentive;  freedom  from  fines  is  another.  There  are  certain 
agreements  listed in Article 4  of  Regulation  17  that  are  exempted  from 
notification.  Furthermore,  notifications  are  not  required  where  there 
is  no  appreciable  effect  on  trade  between Member  States.  However,  this 
"de minimis"  concept  is not  very  reliable. 
20)  As  noticed by Forrester and  Norall  (1984),  businessmen  "wish to discern 
the  path  to  sanctity  or  absolution  without  passing  through  the 
burdensome  process  of confession"  (p.  308,  note  2). 
21)  Recently the European  Commission  elaborated a  general project proposing 
a  definition and  a  typology  of  joint  ventures  setting  out  a  framework 
of  competition  policy  within  which  "constructive  joint  ventures  can 
flourish".  The  Commission  intends  to  provide general  practical guidance 
for enterprises in the  form of a  Notice  ,  ultimately to  be  published  in 
the  Official  Journal.  This  kind  of  "policy  announcement"  could  reduce 
the difficulty of  unpredictable enforcement  of  the  competition rules  in 
everyday business life. -15-
A  clear  illustration  is  the  block  exemption  Regulation  of  R  &  D 
agreements,  which  came  into force  in March  1985.  This  new  regulation leaves 
intact  the  1968  Notice  on  cooperation  between  enterprises,  which  states 
that  cooperation  agreements  relating  only  to  R  &  D  normally  do  not  fall 
under Article 85  para.  1.  But  it extends  this favourable  treatment  to R & D 
agreements  which  also  provide  for  joint  exploitation  of  the  results.  To 
appreciate  its  content,  it is  necessary  to  examine  in  some  depth  the  role 
of  cooperative R & D. 
PART  II :  COOPERATIVE  AGREEMENTS  IN It &  D 
In  this  second  part,  we  shall  first  identify  the  main  private 
advantages  and  disadvantages  of  R  & D cooperation,  then  their  main  public 
costs  and  benefits.  The  paradox  that  will  emerge  is  that  there  are  more 
obstacles  to  cooperative  R  & D than  to  collusion  in  other  areas,  in  spite 
of  the  positive  social  welfare  effect  often  associated  with  such 
cooperation.  The  Policy  option  taken  by  the  European  Commission  in  its 
Regulation 418/85 will  then  be  discussed. 
Section 1  :  Private cost-benefit analysis of cooperative R & D 22) 
Three  types  of  private potential benefits of cooperative R & D can  be 
identified. First,  cooperative agreements  are an alternative to either pure 
market  transactions  or  integration  within  the  firm  under  a  single 
administrative  structure.  Its choice  could,  therefore,  indicate  that it is 
perceived as  a  compromise  between  commitment  and  flexibility. 
On  the  one  hand,  in-house developments  or mergers  tend  to create very 
rigid  structures  without  easy  mechanism  for  switching  research capability, 
strategy  and  partners  over  time.  This  can  call  into  question  a  company's 
ability to  innovate or  respond  to innovation,  and  impede  access  to know-how 
which  it  cannot  develop  internally  or  can  acquire  only  with  irreductible 
delays  in developing  and  testing products  in-house. 
22)  The  following  arguments  are  partly  based  on  empirical  studies  and 
interviews.  For  the u.s.  see  e.g.  Berg,  Duncan  & Friedman  {1982),  and 
for  the EEC,  Jacquemin,  Lammerant  and  Spinoit  {1985). -16-
On  the  other  hand,  arms'-length  transactions  do  not  allow  for  long-
term  relationships,  which  are  generally  crucial  in  technology.  Frequent 
switching  is  costly  and  inefficient  because  the  process  of  R & D,  as  well 
as  technology  transfer,  require  prolonged  interaction  and  experience 
between  partners  to  exploit  or  develop  complementaries  which  affect  the 
costs  and  benefits  of  innovations.  Furthermore,  market  transactions  are 
expected  to  be  affected  by  moral  hazard  and  adverse  selection.  Indeed  the 
domain  of  R  & D and  innovation is a  typical  case  where  the  agent's  action 
is  not  directly  observable  by  the  principal  and  the  outcome  is  a  random 
variable  whose  distribution  depends  on  the  action  taken.  A  cooperative 
research arrangement  can  then reduce  the  problems  of  asymmetric  information 
and  opportunism,  as  well  as  the  vagueness  of  monitoring  by  relying  on 
easily measured  R & D inputs. 
A second  potential advantage  of cooperative R & D is to accelerate the 
speed  of  invention  and  innovation  with  less  risk.  On  the  one  hand,  what 
often  matters  is  the  speed  at  which  firms  can  deploy  the  necessary 
resources  and  enter  into  new  markets,  first  over  advantage  depending  upon 
an ability to  do  it more  quickly  than rivals;  on  the  other hand  the absence 
of  a  complete  and  perfect  set  of  contingency  markets  makes  useful  joint 
actions  which  permit  risk-spreading,  i.e.,  sharing  the  benefits  and  costs 
of  a  project  among  a  number  of  firms,  and  risk-pooling,  i.e. pursuing more 
technological avenues  and  (relatively)  independent  projects. 
Finally,  the  pooling  of  various  complementary  resources  in  R  & D can 
provide  financial  capital  at  better  conditions  if  capital  markets  are 
imperfect,  spread  the  high  fixed  costs  of  technology  development,  and 
produce  synergetic  effects  by  the  combination  of  research  information, 
teams  of scientists,  technological  and  marketing know-how,  etc. 
Despite  the previous  arguments,  cooperative agreements  in R & D are not 
very  frequent.  When  they  exist,  empirical  evidence  shows  that  they  are 
fragile  and  unstable  arrangements  confronted  with  various  difficulties, 
which  generally  lead  to  early  break-ups,  buy-outs  or  mergers.  This  situa-
tion is aggravated within Europe  where  the majority  of  R & D arrangements -17-
are  multicountry  and  where  divergent  objectives,  strategies,  domestic 
regulations,  and  institutions  often  combine  with  socio-psychological 
factors  such  as  nationalistic  feelings,  fear  of  a  loss  of  identity,  and 
clash of  corporate cultures. 
Arrangements  relating  only  to  R  &  D  have  a  number  of  important 
handicaps.  At  a  first  stage,  partner  selection  and  the  possibility  of 
defining  well-balanced  contributions  is  an  important  barrier.  The  fear  is 
that  one  partner  will  be  strengthened  by  the  technological  cooperation  in 
such  a  way  that  it will  become  a  dangerous  competitor at  the  level  of  the 
. product  market.  This  situation  is  of  course  more  probable  for  horizontal 
agreements  than  for  vertical  ones.  In  the  later  case,  complementarities 
allow the benefits  to  be  distributed according  to  the  respective activities 
and  products.  In  the  case  of  cooperation  between  competitors  geographical 
partition is the most  obvious way  of  trying  to  solve  the  problem but it has 
a  side-effect on  existing competition.  The  compromise  between collaboration 
and  independence  is  reflected  in  the  organizational  structure  of  the 
arrangement,  which  is  often  ambiguous,  complex  and  implying  heavy 
transaction costs of negotiation. 
At  a  second  stage,  the  management  of  existing  cooperative  agreements 
and  the  sharing  of  the  benefits  are  also  difficult.  First,  in  the  absence 
of an efficient system of management,  the  transaction costs  of  coordination 
and  cooperation may  outweight  the  benefits,  especially when  a  large  number 
of  actors  is  involved.  Second,  even  with  lengthy  contracts  containing 
explicit  clauses  concerning  confidentiality  and  transmission  of 
information,  patent  licenses,  trademark,  and  copyright,  there  are 
fundamental  limits  on  the  ability  to  protect  intellectual  property,  given 
that  scientific  knowledge  has  many  aspects  of  a  public  good,  that  its 
results  are  not  easily  incorporated  and  that  the  speed  of  incorporation 
will  vary  from  one  firm  to  another.  In  fact,  there  are  often  close 
connections  between  the effectiveness of  basic research,  conventional R & D 
resources,  and marketing  and manufacturing resources.  Von  Hippel  (1982)  and 
Flaherty  (1980)  have  shown  the  multiple  interactions  of  technological 
advantages  with  conventional  business  resources  in  various  fields.  Their 
analyses  imply  that  the  full  exploitation  of  the  results  of  cooperative -18-
marketing  to  sell  products  which  embody  these  results.  Successful 
achievement  of  first-mover  advantages  in  research  depends  upon  an  ability 
to  bring  quickly  new  products  and  techniques  to  the  market  where  the 
greatest potential strategic payoffs are encountered. 
Limiting  cooperation  to  pure  R & D or  to  the  so-called "precompetitive 
level"  will  then  exercise  a  strong  deterrent  effect  on  the  emergence  of 
such cooperative arrangements23). 
Seeton  2:  Public  Cost-Benefit  Analysis  of  Cooperative  R  &  D  and  the 
European Regulation 
The  main  arguments  in  favor  of  socially  beneficial  effects  of 
cooperative research is  based  on  a  problem  of  market  failure,  bound  to  the 
appropriability  of  returns24).  The  starting  point  is  that  the  amount  of 
research made  by  private  firms  and  the  diffusion of  the  knowedge  generated 
by  them  may  be  socially inefficient  over  a  broad  range  of market  structure 
including competition.  Two  situations can  be  distinguished. 
Assume  first that  there are no  spillovers or externalities so  that  each 
firm's R & D influences  only  its own  costs.  Nevertheless,  as  long  as  firms 
in  the  pre-innovation  market  would  not  expect  a  perfect  discriminating 
monopoly  in  the  post-innovation market,  appropriation  of  the  entire  social 
value  from  innovation will  not  be  expected.  Even  the  pre-innovation  mono-
polist would  not  generally invest  the socially optimal amount  in R & D. 
23)  The  characteristics  of  the  industry  play also  an  important  role  in  the 
propensity to  cooperate.  In a  case  such as  biotechnology which is in an 
early  and  highly  competitive  stage,  in  which  patentable  processes  and 
know-how  are  of  great  importance,  even  basic  research  can  lead  to 
commercial  concepts  that  companies  can  quickly  connect  to  final 
products.  There is then a  limited interest in cooperative activity,  non 
cooperative  strategies  being  often more  rewarding.  On  the  contrary,  in 
a  more  mature  sector  like  semiconductor  industry,  cooperative  efforts 
are frequent. 
24)  This  is  an  essential distinction between  R & D and  capital,  suggesting 
the danger  of modelling R & D expenditures like investment  in capital. -19-
A fortiori when  price  competition in the  post-innovation market  intensifies 
as  the  number  of  R & D competitors  in  the  pre-innovation market  increases, 
it  is  more  likely  that  the  value  of  the  surplus  of  total  R  & D revenues 
above  post-innovation costs will fall  short  of  the  social value.  Moreover, 
the  knwoledge  generated  by  the  R & D of  the  individual firm will be  priced 
incorrectly.  Given  the  existing  degree  of  appropriability,  diffusion  of 
this knowledge  will not  be  priced at  the marginal  cost  of  its dissemination 
(which  is  often  close  to  zero),  but  at  higher  prices.  This  may  lead 
competing  firms  to wasteful duplication of  research. 
Now  suppose  that  there  are  substantial  R  &  D  externalities  or 
spillovers:  the benefits of  each firm's  R & D flow without  payment  to other 
firms.  This  leads  to  underinvestment  in  R  &  D  relative  to  the  social 
optimum  and  to  a  structure  of  knowledge  supply  which  is  determined  by  the 
different  degrees  of  appropriabili  ty  of  the  various  types.  Incentives  to 
innovate  will  also  be  reduced  as  the  potential  innovator  knows  that 
competitors will be  freely strengthened by its own  R & D investments. 
It  can  then  be  argued  that  cooperative  R  &  D  can  improve  both 
situations and  alleviate the  trade off identified by  Spence  (1984). 
According  to  this  trade-off,  the  incentives  of  a  firm  to  do  R  &  D 
requires  a  sufficient degree  of appropriability of  the benefits,  and  thus  a 
limited  diffusion  of  knowledge;  but  on  the  other  hand  a  near-perfect 
appropriability  (whether  created  by  circumstances  or  policy)  impedes 
spillovers  of  the  results  of  R  & D to  other  firms,  at  no-cost,  and  hence 
does  not  allow a  sufficient decrease in aggregate R & D costs for achieving 
a  given level of cost  reduction. 
Cooperative  R  &  D  can  then  be  viewed  as  a  means  of  simultaneously 
internalizing  the  externalities  created  by  significant  R  & D spillovers  -
hence  improving  the  incentive  problem  and  limiting  wasteful  duplication  --20-
and  providing a  more  efficient sharing of  information among  firms25). 
Katz  (1986)  has  rigourously  established  the  conditions  under  which  a 
cooperative  agreement  could  raise  welfare  through  its  effects  on  the 
equilibrium  level  of  R  &  D  and  on  the  cost  of  achieving  a  given  R  &  D 
level. 
"cooperative R & D is  most  likely  to  have  beneficial  incentive  effects 
in markets  that have  strong spillovers in the  absence of cooperation; 
when  firms  have  flexibility in  their  choices  of  both R  & D cost-sharing 
and  R  & D output-sharing rates,  cooperative  R  & D arrangements  are most 
likely  to  have  beneficial  effects  in  markets  where  a  high  rate  of 
between-member  spillover  or  R & D sharing is feasible,  such  as  in basic 
research"  (p.  542). 
This  leads  us  to  mention  briefly  a  second  argument  for  permitting  or 
encouraging  cooperative R & D. 
In  certain  high  technology  industries,  such  as  the  next  generation  of 
mainframe  computers,  firms  are  producing,  under  increasing  returns  of 
scale,  differentiated  products  on  which  basic  research  can  lead  to 
production  of  a  higher  quality  product.  In  such  industries,  equilibrium is 
characterized  by  the  presence  of  a  limited  number  of  firms,  each  of  which 
makes  positive  profits  (net  of  any  fixed  costs).  In  this  case  the 
neo-classical competitive paradigm does  not apply,  as  "natural" oligopolies 
are  dictated  by  the  exogenous  conditions  of  supply  and  demand.  If  certain 
potential  entrants  in  such  markets  enjoy  an  advantage  as  a  result  of  a 
cooperative  agreement,  this  may  then  favour  equilibrium  outcomes  in  which 
the 
25)  Compared  with  the  patent  system,  cooperative  R  &  D  leads  to  a  large 
diffusion of knowledge.  Industry-wide  cooperative research laboratories 
(especially  important  in  Scandinavia)  and  industry-university 
cooperation  are  especially  useful  as  they  allow  the  results  of 
individual development  projects  from  firm to  firm  to  be  generalized and 
transferred,  "thus  providing  a  degree  of  economies  of  scope  to 
innovation programmes  across  an  industry or activity as  a  whole",  Ergas 
(1986).  Relying  on  subsidies  meets  several  limits:  it  does  not  solve 
the  diffusion  problem,  it can  introduce  new  distortions  and  it is not 
easy  to control. - 21-
cooperating  firms  are  able  to  enter  while  certain  of  their  independent 
rivals decide  otherwise. 
By  promoting  R  &  D  cooperation  between  European  firms,  the  European 
authorities  could  then  succeed  in  giving  these  firms  a  better  base  for 
oligopolistic  competition  against  foreign  rivals  and  in  getting  a  larger 
share  of high-return industries. 
Contrasting  with  these  potential  advantages  of  cooperative  R  &  D, 
effects  leading  to  a  harmful  reduction  of  competition  must  also  be 
considered.  This  question  could  be  explored  on  the  basis  of  a  model  having 
the  standard  two-stage  form,  with  R  &  D  expenditures  in  period  one 
affecting  the  parameters  of  the  second  period  output/price  game.  Solving 
the  latter  yields  profit  functions  (gross  of  R  &  D  costs)  that  are 
dependent  upon  the  earlier  R  &  D  choices.  The  shapes  of  these  functions 
depend,  among  other  things,  on  the  nature  of  competition:  for  instance 
non-cooperation  in R & D and  in output,  cooperation in R & D and  in output, 
cooperation  in  R  &  D  and  non-cooperation  in  output,  non-cooperation  in 
R & D and  cooperation in output26). 
26)  A  possible  model  is  the  following  one.  Let  us  assume  a  two  stage  game 
played  by  two  competing  firms.  At  the  second  stage  (say  the  choice  of 
output)  in  which  R  &  D  levels  are  treated  as  exogenous,  firm  1 
(respectively  firm  2)  produces  output  q1  at  unit  production 
cost  Cl(X1,X2)  where  Xl  and  x2  denote  the  R  & D level  of  respectively 
firms  1  and  2.  Profit ~ 1  of  firm  1  is then 
~i(q1,q2,Xl,X2) = Ri  (ql,q2)  - Ci  (Xl,X2)  qi-vi(Xi) 
With c3c.t,f  dX.I\  (  0, dc.lf d)(..t < 0  and  dvi/dxi )  0. 
i  = 1,2 
The  solutions,  q1*  and  q2*,  at  the  cooperative  or  non-cooperative 
equilibrium,  can  be written as 
The  first stage in which  firms  choose  R  & D levels  is  then  considered. 
Using  the  second  stage  solution,  profits  of  each  firm are written as  a 
function  of  the pair of R & D levels 
The  cooperative or non-cooperative solutions  to  this first stage  can be 
obtained  by  maximising  profit with  respect  to  xi.  This  gives  rise to  a 
subgame  perfect  equilibrium  in  the  two  stage  game.  For  preliminary 
results,  see  the appendix. -22-
In  the  absence  of  a  model  reflecting  the  complete  picture,  let  us 
simply distinguish between  two  situations. 
First,  let  us  assume  that  it is  feasible  to  limit  the  extent  of  the 
agreement  solely  to  aspects  of  R  &  D  and  to  exclude  coordination  at  the 
level  of  the  final  product  (  pre-coapetitive  level ).  The  dangers  of 
anticompetitive  consequences  are  then  strongly  reduced.  Still,  one  danger 
is  that  cooperative  R  &  D  could  be  a  way  for  a  dominant  firm  to  avoid 
competition  through  innovation,  by  co-opting  potentially  very  innovative 
rivals  and  by  controlling  and  slowing  down  the  innovation  race  (Reinganum, 
1983).  Coordinating  the R & D process  so as  to avoid  duplication can  reduce 
initiative  and  lead  to  inflexibility  and  to  waste  in  dead-end  research, 
when  multiple,  not  perfectly correlated research strategies could  have  been 
feasible.  At  the  other  extreme,  incumbent  firms  with  market  power  can, 
through  concerted  pre-emptive  operations,  excessively  accelerate  their 
programmes  of  R & D and  innovation in order  to exercise a  dissuasive  impact 
on  potential  entrants  (Gilbert  and  Newbery,  1982).  In  the  situation  of 
integrated  firms,  cooperative  agreement  for  the  purpose  of  knowledge 
exchange  could  also  lead  to  barriers  to  entry  downstream  and  foreclose 
firms  who  are  not  members  of  the  agreement  from  some  segment  of  the 
market.  Firms  being  at  the  frontier  of  technological  change  could  for 
example  jointly  determine  standards  for  future  products  and  processes, 
making  new  entry more  difficult. 
A  second  situation  involves  an  extended  collusion  between  partners, 
resulting  from  their  action  in  R  & D  and  creating  common  policies  at  the 
product  stage  (  coapetitive  level ) .  Discussions  about  R  &  D  can  for 
example  spill over  into  illegal discussions  of  pricing policy.  Cooperative 
R  &  D  can  also  provide  a  ready  mechanism  for  side  payments  in  the  event 
that it is useful for  cartel members  to redistribute the  revenues  earned  by 
the  firm  as  a  result  of  product  market  division.  What  makes  these  dangers 
probable  is  again  the  difficulty  of  appropriating  technological 
breakthroughs.  As  discussed  in  section  1  of  Part  II,  partners  who  have 
achieved  inventions want  to control  the processes  and  products which  embody 
the results  of  their  collaboration,  in order  to  recuperate  jointly,  and  as -23-
quickly  as  possible,  their  R  & D  investments.  If  the  firms  are  prevented 
from  such a  joint exploitation and if the  benefits of  cooperative R  & D are 
expected  to  be  very  quickly  dissipated  through  intense  product  market 
competition,  firms  will be  tempted either to avoid R & D cooperation and  to 
maintain wasteful  competition  in the  pre-innovation market  or  to  use  their 
cooperation  to  limit  unduly  their  R  & n27).  If  this  is true,  a  regulation 
of  R  & D  cooperation excluding  any  cooperation at  the  level of  the  final 
.arkets  could  discourage or destabilize many  valuable agreements.  However. 
allowing  an  extension  of  cooperation  from  R  &  D  to  manufacturing  and 
distribution  encourages  collusive  behaviour  which  im.pedes  co•petition  • 
This is precisely the  dilemma  faced  by  the European Antitrust Authorities. 
The  text  of  the  regulation  418/85  expresses  the  compromise  that  has 
been  adopted.  It  covers  joint  research  and  development  of  products  or 
processes  and  joint exploitation of  the results of  that R & D. 
Art.  1(2)(d)  specifies  that  "exploitation  of  the  results"  means  the 
manufacture  of  the  joint  venture  product  or  the  licensing  of  intellectual 
property rights  to  third parties.  But  joint marketing is not  covered. 
Among  various  conditions,  the  exemption applies if: 
(i)  the work  is carried out within  the  framework  of  a  defined  programme; 
(ii)  all the parties have  access  to  the  results; 
(iii) where  there  is  no  joint  exploitation,  each  party  is  free  to  exploit 
the results  independently; 
(iv)  the  know-how  and  the  patents  which  result  from  the  research 
contribute  substantially  to  technical  and  economic  progress  and  are 
indispensable for  the manufacture  of  the  joint venture  product. 
By  imposing  conditions  concerning  the  duration  of  the  venture  and  market 
shares,  the  regulation also aims  to prevent  agreements  that might  result in 
the elimination of competition in the relevant market.  If the  joint venture 
is  of  the  conglomera!  or  vertical  type,  i.e.  if  the  participants  do  not -24-
compete  on  the  relevant  product  market, 
years,  regardless  of  market  share.  If 
the  exemption  applies  for  five 
the  joint  venture  is  of  the 
horizontal  type,  the exemption also applies for  five years,  but  only if the 
parties'  combined  share  of  the relevant  product market  does  not  exceed  20%. 
A  comprehensive  list of  permissible  clauses  (the  so-called white  list) 
and  prohibited  (the so-called black list) is also  included. 
The  main  aspect  of  the  Regulation  is  that  the  European  author! ties, 
confronted  with  the  dilemma  mentioned  above,  consider  that  cooperation  in 
R  & D,  in  many  cases,  cannot  be  limited  to  the  sole  level  of  pure  R  & D, 
and  that  it will  generally  lead  to  joint  exploitation  of  the  results  in 
order  to  stabilize  the  agreements  and  to  solve  the  appropriability 
problem.  Moreover  the  Regulation gives  priority to basic research and  tends 
to  secure  an  efficient  sharing  of  information.  Finally  it  rejects 
arrangements  able  to monopolize  the market. 
However,  several problems  remain.  From  the businessmen's  point of  view, 
the  Regulation  is  complex;  it  is  necessary  to  overcome  its  opacity  by 
issuing new  guidelines.  The  20%  threshold market  share  for  horizontal  joint 
ventures  is  disputable,  especially  in  high  technology.  The  exclusion  of 
joint  selling  and  marketing  is  an  important  limitation,  given  the  close 
interconnections  between  the  various  phases  of  the  activities28).  From  the 
point  of  view  of  public  interest,  the  Regulation  might  have  the  unwanted 
siae-effect  of  exempting  many  production  joint ventures  from  notification, 
especially  given  the  broadness  of  some  concepts  and  criteria  used  in  the 
text.  The  drafters  of  joint  venture  contracts  could  indeed  be  tempted  to 
include  an  R  & D element  in  their  agreements  in  order  to  fall  within  the 
scope  of  the  block  exemption.  In  this  context,  the  Commission  must  be 
conscious  of  the  dangers  of any  further  relaxation of its antitrust policy, 
which  until  now  has  been  a  powerful  instrument  for  the  survival  of  a 
competitive  common  market. 
Finally,  one wonders  whether modifications  to  the  competition rules are 
the  crucial  tool  needed  to  prod  industry  into  forming  new  R  &  D  joint 
28)  But,  an  exemption  could  still  be  obtained  on  the  basis  of  Art .85 
para.3,  following  a  notification. -25-
ventures.  As  long  as  antitrust  rules  in  the  field  of  R  &  D  cooperation 
reflect  a  form  of  industrial  policy  to  foster  innovations  and  improve 
ventures.  As  long  as  antitrust  rules  in  the  field  of  R  &  D  cooperation 
reflect  a  form  of  industrial  policy  to  foster  innovations  and  improve 
international  competitiveness,  more  positive  incentives  would  seem 
appropriate.  One  of  them  could  be  specific  tax deductions  and/or  subsidies 
like  those  provided  by  the  Esprit  programme.  A  complementary  one  would  be 
transnational  legal  structures,  such  as  the  recently  adopted European 
Interest  Grouping 29),  which  provides  firms  with  flexible  instruments  for 
pooling  some  business  functions,  while  retaining  their  economic  and  legal 
independence. 
29)  Unhappily,  the  European  form  does  not  provide  fiscal  incentives, 
contrary to  the  French system. -26-
CONCLUSION 
The  European  Commission  White  Paper  (1985)  on  "Completing  the  Internal 
Market"  underlines  the  role  played  by  cooperation  among  firms,  which  is 
viewed  as  an  important means  of  improving European competitiveness. 
Our  analysis  has  shown  that  contrary  to  the  conventional  wisdom, 
various  factors  facilitate  the  adoption  and  the  stabilization of  collusive 
behaviour.  But  in  some  areas  such  as  R  & D,  the  effects  of  these  factors 
can  be  more  than  compensated  by  the  role  of  specific  characteristics, 
mainly  the difficulty of  appropriating  the  results  of  the  joint effort.  It 
follows  that  too  much  collusion  tend  to  occur  in  activities  where 
non-cooperative,  non-collusive  behaviour  would  be  more  socially efficient. 
Inversely  insufficient  cooperation  can  occur  in  domains  where  such  a 
behaviour  could  lead  to  socially desirable  outcomes.  An  important  case  is 
R & D where  cooperative agreements  can internalize externalities created by 
R  & D spillovers,  limit  wasteful  duplication  and  provide  a  more  efficient 
sharing of  information. 
These  considerations  stress  the  importance  of  a  pragmatic  competition 
policy.  Article  85  of  the  Treaty  of  Rome,  its  efficiency  defence  and 
the  Regulation  on  R  &  D  cooperation,  seem  globally  well  adapted  to  this 
role,  but more  transparency  and  explicit precommitments  could  increase the 
credibility of  such a  policy. -27-
APPENDIX 
In  a  recent  paper,  c.  d'Aspremont  and  A.  Jacquemin  (1987)  have 
considered  an  industry  with  two  firms  facing  an  inverse  demand  function 
n-1(Q),  where  Q=q1+q2  is the  total quantity produced.  Each  firm has  cost  of 
production Ci  (qi,Xi,Xj)  which  is a  function  of its own  production,  qi,  of 
the  amount  of  research Xi  that it undertakes  and  the  amount  of  research Xj 
undertaken by its rival.  Both n-1  and  C are assumed  linear,  so  that 
n-1  = a  - b  ~ 
with a,  b  > o,  and 
Ci  (qi,Xi,Xj)  = [A-xi- Xj] qi  i  =  1,2  j  ;  i 
with a  > A >  0,  1 >  ~ >  0  ,  xi + {'>  x j  l::.  A,  Q !:. t 
The  R  &  D  externalities  or  spillovers  imply  that  some  benefits  of  each 
firm's  R  & D  flow  without  payment  to  other  firms.  In  our  specification  the 
external  effect  of  firm  j  R  &  D  is  to  lower  firm  i'  s  unit  production 
cost.  The  cost  of  R  &  D  is  assumed  to  be  quadratic,  reflecting  the 
existence of  diminishing returns  to R & D expenditures 
i  = 1,2 
2 
Firms'  strategies  consist  of  a  level  of  research  and  a  subsequent 
production  strategy  based  on  their  R  & D  choice.  At  the  second  stage  in 
which  R  &  D  are  treated  as  exogenous,  firms  choose  noncooperatively  or 
cooperatively,  their optimal  production  q1  and  q2.  The  preceeding  stage  in 
which  firms  choose,  noncooperatively  or  cooperatively,  their  R  &  D  level 
is then solved. -28-
Using  this  framework  d'Aspremont  and  Jacquemin  have  computed  and 
compared  the  corresponding  subgame  perfect equilibria.  Defining x**,  x*,  ~, 
,...) 
and  x,  as  the  equilibrium  levels  of  R  &  D  obtained  in  the  case  of, 
respectively,  the  maximization  of  social  welfare  (consumer  surplus  + 
producer  surplus),  the  fully non-cooperative  game,  the  cooperation  limited 
to  R  &  D,  and  the  cooperation  occuring  in  both  R  &  D  and  output,  they 
obtain the  following classification 
"-)  /'\ 
x**  )  x  )  x  > x* 
I 
for  large  spillovers.  For  the  total  quantity  produced,  Q,  the 
classification is the  following 
J\  -""oJ 
Q**  >  Q  ,  Q*  >  Q • 
One  clear conclusion is that cooperation  in R  & D increases  both R  & D and 
quantities of  production with respect  to ·the noncooperative solution. -29-
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